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The thesis of Richard Posner's Law and Literature: A Relation Rear-
gued' is that the study of literature and the interpretation of statutes are
very different activities and that one "has little to contribute"' to the
other. Let me say at the outset that Judge Posner is right. Literary and
legal interpretation are distinct and the skills they separately require are
not readily convertible. But while Posner's large point is well taken, the
reasons with which he supports it are not, for they take the form of a
series of distinctions no one of which can be maintained.
The basic distinction concerns the vexed matter of intention and is
framed in terms made familiar to us by recent debates about constitutional
interpretation. There are according to Posner two ways of reading, one
that "requires [the interpreter] to discern" the intention of the author or
authors of a text and another that requires the interpreter "merely to as-
sign some coherent and satisfying meaning" to a text independently of
what any author might or might not have intended.3 The first kind of
reading is appropriate for legal texts, while the second, identified by Pos-
ner as "New Critical," is appropriate for literary texts.4 While it would
be possible in Posner's view to read either kind of text in either way-to
interpret a poem as the realization of a specific intention or to interpret a
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statute as if it were an "interesting verbal artifact" 5-the results would be
"otiose" 6 and distorting, reducing the richness of a beautiful artifact to the
statement of an author's "banal" intention7 on the one hand, depriving the
words of a statute "of their historical context,"' and thus of their power to
constrain, on the other. It is clear that for Posner, as for many others, the
issue of intention is one with the issue of constraint. Those who ignore
intention, either because they are bad jurists or good literary critics, cut
themselves loose from contextual constraints; while those who defer to in-
tention allow contextual constraints to limit the scope of their interpretive
activity.
Every part of this picture is wrong. There is only one way to read or
interpret and that is the way of intention; but to read intentionally is not
to be constrained relative to some other (non-existent) way of reading.
The reason for both truths is the same: Words are intelligible only within
the assumption of some context of intentional production, some already
in-place pre-decision as to what kind of person, with what kind of pur-
poses in relation to what specific goals in a particular situation, is
speaking or writing. To approach the matter from the other direction:
Meanings are not embedded in words but emerge and are perspicuous in
the light of background conditions of intelligibility. One could not "merely
• . .assign some coherent. . . meaning" 9 to a text independent of a con-
sideration of intention because any meaning one might assign would be
thinkable only in the light of an intentional structure already assumed in
advance. In those cases in which meanings seem immediately available
without recourse to anything but the words themselves, it is because the
intentional structure-the conditions of intelligibility that limit the mean-
ings words can have before they are produced-is so deeply in place that
we are not aware of it and seem to experience its effects directly, without
mediation. Consider the small example of the utterance "Can you pass the
salt?," immediately construed by the vast majority of native speakers as a
request for performance of a specific action rather than as a question
about the hearer's physical abilities; but this is so only because in the very
hearing of the utterance we assume the meal-time setting populated by
agents concerned with eating and drinking in the context of communal
resources. If one varies the setting and reconceives it as a conversation
between a doctor and a patient recovering from surgery, the utterance
"Can you pass the salt?" could indeed be heard as a question about the
hearer's physical ability, and could be so heard immediately and literally.








what the example displays is a distinction between the literal meaning of
an utterance and the meaning it acquires when placed in a particular
context. Both meanings-the meaning of "request for performance" and
the meaning of "inquiry into one's capacities"-are literal given the in-
place force of some intentional context of production. Independently of
some such already assumed context (and of course there could be many
more than two) the utterance wouldn't have any meaning at all, and in-
deed wouldn't be an utterance, but merely a succession of noises or marks.
To put the point proverbially, intentions (or their assumption) come
first, meanings second; and there can therefore be no distinction between
intentional construing and some other, more free-wheeling kind. But this
does not mean that interpretation is as safely constrained as some propo-
nents of intentionalism claim it is, because while it is true that interpreta-
tion cannot proceed independent of intention, it is also true that intentions
are themselves interpretively produced and therefore cannot serve (except
in the most general and non-voluntarist sense) as a check on interpretive
activity. In the example of "Can you pass the salt?" it is always possible
that someone at a dinner table may hear the question as one about his
abilities, or that a patient may hear his doctor asking him to pass the salt
(perhaps as a preliminary to an experiment). The fact that interpretation
is irremediably intentional means only that one cannot choose between
intentional reading and something else; but that still leaves the problem of
determining exactly what the intention of which an utterance is the ex-
pression is. Since one cannot read back from the utterance to the intention
(for that would be possible only if utterances were meaningful apart from
intention, or had as part of their meaning a specification of the intention
behind them), the intention must be supplied or constructed by the very
interpreter who will then cite it in support of the meanings he "finds."
This conclusion may seem paradoxical, but it is not: All interpretation
is intentional-assuming as the ground of its possibility a purposeful
agent who has produced its object-but intentions do not constrain inter-
pretation because the shape of the agent's purpose can itself be the matter
of interpretive dispute. Undoing the distinction between reading with and
without the anchor of intention also undoes the possibility of distinguish-
ing between reading that is constrained and reading that is not, and this
in turn undoes every distinction invoked by Posner in the course of his
essay. I have myself counted fifteen, and they are all the same: Each posits
an opposition between an interpretive activity that is answerable to public
(factual, historical) and formal (verbal, logical) requirements, and an in-
terpretive activity that is (at least relatively) free to go its own untram-
meled way. In addition to the one already noted (between intentional and
non-intentional interpretation) there are (1) the distinction between "in-
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terpretation" and "construction"; 0 (2) the distinction between words
moored by history and context and words "wrenched free of their histori-
cal context"; a (3) the distinction between defined and "undefined law-
making power"; 2 (4) the implied distinction between "highly specific lan-
guage" and vague, non-specific language;" (5) the distinction between
legislation that limits the judiciary and legislation that gives the judiciary
a "blank check";" (6) the distinction between language (poetry, for exam-
ple) that is simply "beautiful and moving" and language that has legal or
political "significance"; 5 (7) the distinction between verbal production
that is purposeful and occasional and verbal production that is "uncon-
scious" or the effusion of genius; (8) the distinction between language
bounded by "period and culture" and language that is able to "transcend
boundaries" because it has a "certain generality and even universality,"
i.e. means nothing in particular;a6 (9) the distinction between bound and
free ("irresponsible") reading;i" (10) the distinction between judging as an
activity constrained by "authoritative texts" and literary criticism as an
activity that deals with texts that are themselves detached from issues of
authority and power;" s (11) the distinction between non-ambiguous and
ambiguous texts; 9 (12) the distinction between non-rhetorical and rhetori-
cal modes of discourse; (13) the distinction between scientific discourse
and discourse less responsible to canons of logic and proof;20 (14) the dis-
tinction between neutral, colorless language and language colored by
style;2 (15) the distinction between scientific language and persuasive
language.22
Since everything that Posner says flows from these distinctions, they
are, in the end, what he is asserting, and I contend that none of them can
be maintained, at least not in the way required by his argument. Consider
for example the cluster formed by numbers 12 through 15. Scientific lan-
guage, according to Posner, is distinguished by logic rather than style; that
is to say (and these claims are of course interchangeable), scientific dis-
course relies not on rhetoric, but on something akin to mathematical dem-
onstration,23 and it is the nature of mathematical demonstration or experi-

















more appropriate to "areas of uncertainty" where "direct confirmation" of
a hypothesis is unavailable.2 Within its circle this is a tight argument,
but the argument falls with the fall of its basic premise: "Not all modes of
discourse are rhetorical."25 All modes of discourse are rhetorical, where
"rhetorical" means proceeding on the basis of assumptions and distinc-
tions that are open to challenge, even though there may be times when no
one is challenging them. The derivations that make up a scientific proof
or a deductive argument in law rely for their force-that is, for their per-
suasiveness-on distinctions (such as that between rest and motion or
public and private) that have themselves been put in place by debates just
like those in relation to which they are now regarded as uncontroversial
and directly confirming. It is because they are now (that is, for a time)
uncontroversial that the assertion of such distinctions will be thought as
devoid of "style"; but in fact it will be assertion in a style that by virtue of
an institutional success has won the right to offer itself as impersonal, as
proceeding from no particular point of view. The difference then between
science or law, on the one hand, and literary criticism, on the other, is not
the difference between rhetoric (or style) and something else, but between
the different rhetorics that are powerful in the precincts of different disci-
plines; and the difference between the rhetoric of science-the rhetoric of
proof, deduction, and mathematical certainty-and other rhetorics in mod-
ern society is a difference between a prestige discourse, a discourse that
has for historical reasons become associated with the presentation of truth,
and the discourses that will for a time measure themselves against it. I am
not saying that these differences are illusory or that they don't have real
consequences, only that their reality and their consequentiality are histori-
cal achievements-achievements fashioned on the anvil of argument and
debate-and that as historical achievements they can be undone in much
the same way they were achieved.
I have stressed the word "historical" in the previous paragraph because
it names the sense Posner most egregiously lacks. He seems not to under-
stand that the distinctions he so confidently invokes belong not to the na-
ture of things but to conditions that have been put in place by exactly the
labors-interpretive labors-that are supposedly constrained by those dis-
tinctions. He thus falls repeatedly into the error of regarding as universal
the imperatives (both moral and methodological) that are perspicuous only
within local (and therefore revisable) structures of conviction and belief.
Consider, for example, the many-layered argument he makes regarding
the constraints on interpretation inherent in the Eighth Amendment (for-
bidding "cruel and unusual punishment"). Because it has its origin in an
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own reading" on the amendment; and if a court were to go so far as to
find in the provision "a prohibition against sexually segregated prisons,"
its performance "would be as irresponsible as a literary critic's reading of
Virgil's Fourth Eclogue, written before the birth of Christ, as a Christian
allegory-which, as a matter of fact, is how it was read during the Mid-
dle Ages."'26 Here Posner avails himself of what we might call the strategy
of the double absurdity. He thinks it absurd that anyone would so inter-
pret the amendment and he underlines his point by linking that interpre-
tation with one even more obviously absurd, the impossibly anachronistic
reading by a Christian exegete of a pagan poem. The point seems indis-
putable until one realizes that anachronism itself is a cultural concept, tied
to a view of time as linear and irreversible and to a notion of agency as
the property of discrete individuals. The possibility of regarding some-
thing as anachronistic emerges only within the assumptions we have in-
herited from the Enlightenment, assumptions that have conferred on sci-
ence and its procedures the prestige they enjoy in Posner's essay; but
within an older set of assumptions that are, in the end, inseparable from
the hegemony of religion-the prestige discourse that science re-
placed-the reading of a poem in terms its (so-called) author could not
possibly have known would be regarded not as anachronistic, but obvious
and obligatory. That is to say, readers in the Middle Ages proceeded
within the undoubted conviction of God's authorship of all human actions,
physical and verbal, and given that conviction (which could not have been
judged unreasonable, since it formed the field of relevance within which
reasons emerged), a Christian reading of Virgil's poem, a reading that
implied an author not bound by the constraints of chronology, would not
be irresponsible, but compelled. Indeed, it would be incumbent upon any-
one who wanted to take Virgil seriously-as opposed to dismissing him as
an epiphenomenon of carnal history-to produce such a reading, and so
bring him into line with the truths proclaimed by the Holy Scriptures.
That is why, as Posner obligingly reports, the poem was read that way in
the Middle Ages, not because (as his tone implies) medieval men and
women didn't know any better, but because given what they knew with a
certainty no less firm than that provided by the rhetoric of science, to read
that way was nothing more (or less) than the exercise of common sense.
The point is a general one and will hold for Posner's "reading" of the
way in which the Eighth Amendment could not be read responsibly. Here
rather than looking backward to conditions of intelligibility that are no
longer as generally in force as they once were, one need only look forward
to conditions of intelligibility that have not yet fully emerged: All that is
necessary for the practice of sexually segregating prisoners to be consid-
ered "cruel and unusual" would be a conviction strongly held in a society
26. P. 1370 (citation omitted).
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that sexuality and its exercise were at the very center of man's being; so
that if people were asked, "What is the worst, most unbearable, organiza-
tion of social life you can think of?," one often-given answer would be
"sexually segregated." At that point (and it is a point some in our society
have already reached), the classification of the practice as one enjoined by
the Eighth Amendment would be obvious, would "go without saying,"
and to assert otherwise would be to be irresponsible.
Let me be clear. I am not saying that "anything goes," that interpreters
of the Eighth Amendment (or Virgil's Eclogues) are presented with a
"blank check" to be filled in as they like; only that insofar as the filling in
of the check is constrained (and it always will be, Posner's positing of
wholly free interpretive activity is as mistaken-it is the same mistake-as
his positing of an interpretive act that is wholly prescribed), the con-
straints will inhere not in the language of the text (statute or poem) or in
the context (unproblematically conceived by Posner as a "higher" and
self-declaring text) in which it is embedded, but in the cultural assump-
tions within which both texts and contexts take shape for situated agents.
And it will do no good to ask for a specification of those cultural assump-
tions (so that they could then serve as the constraint neither text nor con-
text provides) because specifying is itself an act that occurs within as-
sumptions that it cannot, at the moment of occurrence, specify. The moral
is not that there are no such things as texts or acts, but that our ability to
point to them or perform them depends on pre-articulations and demarca-
tions they cannot contain; and it is only so long as such pre-articulations
and demarcations are in place-and in a place we cannot locate because it
locates and defines us-that texts and acts will have the immediate palpa-
bility they seem always to have.
The mistake is to confuse that palpability-the immediacy with which
shapes make themselves available within local and historical conditions of
intelligibility-with something inherent in those shapes, for that is the
mistake of claiming for interpretively produced entities the status of being
constraints on interpretation. It is a mistake Posner repeatedly makes
when he distinguishes straightforward and specific language from vague
and literary language, and argues (in, to be sure, a commonsense fashion)
that the first is more constraining than the second. (This is the burden of
numbers 2 through 11 on my list.) Here for example is his discussion of a
supposedly unambiguous contract in relation to the operation of the parole
evidence rule:
If a document states that it is the complete integration of the parties'
contract, and the price stated in the document is $100 per pound, the
parole evidence rule will prevent the seller from later offering testi-
mony that in the negotiations leading up to the contract the parties
had agreed that the price would be $100 per pound only for the first
19881
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ten pounds after which it would be $120 a pound. The document is
not ambiguous.
But Posner misses the point. The document is neither ambiguous nor un-
ambiguous in and of itself. The document isn't anything in and of itself,
but acquires a shape and a significance only within the assumed back-
ground circumstances of its possible use, and it is those circum-
stances-which cannot be in the document, but are the light in which "it"
appears and becomes what "it," for a time at least, is-that determine
whether or not it is ambiguous and determine too the kind of straightfor-
wardness it is (again for a time) taken to possess.
It could well be that in the industry related to the contract of Posner's
example it is understood by everyone experienced in the trade that when a
price per pound has been negotiated, it goes without saying that there is
an escalation of 20% after the first ten pounds. Within that understand-
ing, the document would have, and have obviously and without dispute,
the meaning Posner scoffs at. Of course within a different understanding,
a different sense of the way business is typically done, the document will
have just the obvious meaning Posner claims for it, but that obvious
meaning will be no less circumstantial-no less the product of interpretive
assumptions that are not in the text because it is within them that the text
acquires intelligibility-than the meaning he rejects.2" This does not mean
that the document is ambiguous, but that the shape of its straightforward-
ness (or of its ambiguity should that be the face it presents) will always be
a function of something prior to it. Of course, one could always attempt to
make that something (I have been calling it the background conditions of
intelligibility) explicit and thereby (and this is Posner's word) "control"
the document's interpretation; but the intelligibility of the language in
which the background conditions were supposedly made explicit would
itself be a function of still other background conditions that would not be
"in" the text but would nevertheless be determinative of what everyone
(or nearly everyone; there is always room for dispute) took to be its mean-
ing.29 As a frequent flyer, I have been amused recently by the efforts of
airlines to police their lavatories. In particular, I've noticed the now al-
27. P. 1371.
28. The argument should surely be familiar to someone who has read cases in which the court
begins by stating "The issue is, what is chicken?," see Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Interna-
tional Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116, 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); or finds that "I guarantee to give you a
perfect hand" is obviously not a guarantee, see Hawkins v. McGee, 84 N.H. 114, 146 A. 641 (1929);
or declares that "a thing which is within the intention of the makers of a statute is as much within the
statute as if it were within the letter," see Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 509, 22 N.E. 188, 189
(1889).
29. For discussion of the difficulty in trying to articulate these background conditions for "literal"
language, see Fish, Normal Circumstances and Other Special Cases, CRITICAL INQUIRY, Summer
1978, at 625; see also J. SEARLE, Literal Meaning, in EXPRESSION AND MEANING: STUDIES IN THE
THEORY OF SPEECH ACTS 117 (1979).
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most desperate search for a sign whose wording will make absolutely and
explicitly clear what should and should not be flushed down the toilet.
The latest (and doomed) effort goes something like this: "Only toilet pa-
per and tissue should be deposited in the toilet." How long will it be, I
wonder, before stewards and maintenance men begin to find bodily waste,
liquid and solid, deposited in the most inconvenient places, if only by wags
who recognize and testify to the folly of thinking that language can be
made so explicit as to preclude interpretation. Of course, one could add
feces and urine to the list of proper things to deposit, but that would only
fuel the game, not stop it. What stops the game when it is stopped (as it
almost always is) is not the explicitness of words, but the tacit assump-
tions (concerning what toilets are for, and, on an even more basic level,
what is and is not waste in a post-agricultural society) within which the
words immediately take on an unproblematic (though interpretively pro-
duced) shape.
The point is a simple one: All shapes are interpretively produced, and
since the conditions of interpretation are themselves unstable-the possi-
bility of seeing something in a "new light," and therefore of seeing a new
something, is ever and unpredictably present-the shapes that seem per-
spicuous to us now may not seem so or may seem differently so tomorrow.
This applies not only to the shape of statutes, poems, and signs in air-
plane lavatories, but to the disciplines and forms of life within which stat-
utes, poems, and signs become available to us. There is a temptation when
considering these issues to concede the interpretive status of the objects
and texts within an enterprise while claiming for the enterprise itself a
reality less mutable and permutable, to argue, for example, that while
legal and literary texts may change with changes in the conditions of in-
terpretation, the disciplines themselves remain stable-continue always to
be what they essentially are-as do the differences between them. Some-
thing like this seems to lie behind Posner's insistence that when all is said
and done "the study of literature has little to contribute to the interpreta-
tion of statutes and constitutions.""0 As I have already indicated, this
seems to me a correct judgment; but while for Posner the judgment fol-
lows from the essential nature of the two disciplines, I see it as an accu-
rate account of interpretive conditions presently-but not inevitably-in
force. That is, while I agree with his assertion of difference, I disagree
with his specification of its source and with his assumption of its
durability.
The source for many of the differences Posner invokes is the supposedly
master difference between legal and literary language; while the first is
specific and historically tethered, the second is inherently ambiguous and
30. P. 1351.
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unconstrained: "[Elvery great work of literature may well be unclear."3'
This is simply the distinction between clear and unclear contracts writ
large, as a distinction between disciplines rather than a distinction within
a discipline, and it falls by the same argument: To the extent that literary
texts are "unclear"-do not yield straightforward messages as do statutes
or signs in lavatories-it is not because something called "literary lan-
guage" has certain properties, but because literary critics (or at least some
of them) approach their task already in possession of, or possessed by, a
sense of what the object of their professional attention is like, and that
sense, put into operation as a reading strategy, produces both the literary
text and its (supposedly antecedent) properties. As I put the point some
time ago:
If your definition of poetry tells you that the language of poetry is
complex, you will scrutinize the language of something identified as
a poem in such a way as to bring out the complexity you know to be
"there." You will, for example, be on the look out for latent ambigu-
ities . . .you will search for meanings that subvert or exist in a
tension with the meanings that first present themselves. . . .Nor, as
you do these things, will you have any sense of performing in a will-
ful manner, for you will only be doing what you learned to do in the
course of becoming a skilled reader of poetry. 2
All of which is to say that as a fully situated member of an interpretive
community, be it literary or legal, you "naturally" look at the objects of
the community's concerns with eyes already informed by community im-
peratives, urgencies, and goals. Therefore, if it is the goal of your commu-
nity to derive single lines of direction from particular texts (identified as
the Constitution, statutes, precedents), yourfirst glance at such a text will
be informed by that interpretive disposition (indistinguishable from what
you think, in advance, the text is for and also from what you take to be
your relation to it), and you will see, and by seeing produce, that kind of
text. Conversely, if it is the goal of your community to derive as many
lines of direction as possible from a text, your first glance at it will be
informed by that interpretive disposition (and, remember, reading inde-
pendently of an interpretive disposition, of some already in-place sense of
the enterprise in relation to which this is a text, is impossible) and multi-
ple meanings will force themselves upon your attention. Obviously, with
respect to the two communities and their enterprises, interpretive activity
will be different, but rather than being a difference that follows from the
essential nature of law and literature or from the essential properties of
legal and literary language, the difference will be originary, assumed in
31. P. 1371.
32. S. FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? 327 (1980).
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advance and then put into operation so as to produce the formal "evi-
dence" of its rightness, the evidence of straightforward or ambiguous lan-
guage, or of legal as opposed to literary significances.
One cannot then ground the difference between literary and legal inter-
pretation in the different kinds of texts they address, because the textual
differences are themselves constituted by already differing interpretive
strategies, and not the other way around. Nor can one turn this insight
into a new reification of difference by assuming that the strategies specific
to law and literature are themselves basic and unchanging, for they are no
less historically achieved (and therefore contingent) than the texts they
enable us to produce. While it is true that an agent embedded in an enter-
prise proceeds with a firm, if tacit, sense of what the enterprise is (of what
and who it is for and by what routines it accomplishes its ends) and there-
fore with a sense of the differences between it and the other enterprises
that it is not, that sense is itself revisable, and if it is revised (it needn't
be-there is nothing inevitable about any of this), the difference between
the enterprise (conceived of as a set of interpretive dispositions) and some
others may become less sharp. As things stand now in our culture, a per-
son embedded in the legal world reads in a way designed to resolve inter-
pretive crises (although as Walter Michaels reminds me, after he was re-
minded of it by a practicing lawyer, at some stages in the preparation and
even the arguing of cases, the proliferating of interpretive crises is just the
skill called for), while someone embedded in the literary world reads in a
way designed to multiply interpretive crises. 3 It could, however, be other-
wise, and is otherwise even today in some Latin American cultures where
literary productions are understood to issue from specific political agendas
in whose direction they unambiguously point. (We all, of course, remem-
ber the Cultural Revolution in China, with its stipulation as to the con-
tent and message of works that purported to be literature.) To the objec-
tion that in such cultures the essence of the literary has been violated one
must reply that what the examples show (and countless others could be
educed; the story Posner tells in which the literary is equated with the
effusions of genius as it rises above the constraints of any local socio-
political context has been told only since the beginning of the nineteenth
century, and one might reasonably argue that in the long sweep of history
it is an anomaly) is that literature has no essence, only the succession of
forms it takes in different social settings where the space of the liter-
ary-its differential relationship to the activities that limit and enable its
possible actions-is differently opened up.3
At times Posner seems to see this, at least on the legal side of the ques-
33. I have made this point before in response to Owen Fiss. See Fish v. Fiss, 36 STAN. L. REV.
1325, 1344-45 (1984).
34. For general discussion of changes in Western cultural understanding of the "literary," see T.
EAGLETON, LITERARY THEORY 1-53 (1983).
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tion, as when, after declaring, "If I want to learn about fee entails I do
not go to Felix Holt," he adds, "Obviously this is not true in cultures
where the only information about law is found in what we call literature,
though contemporaries thought of it as history . . . ."' Again I want to
agree with Posner that in our culture a legal agent does not go to novelists
for legal instruction when more authorized sources of instruction are read-
ily available; but I would insist that these other cultures (which would of
course include the medieval culture whose infrastructure he dismisses or
ignores) are fully as realized as ours and that the institutional arrange-
ments they display-arrangements that in some cultures result in law be-
ing indistinguishable from religion or prophecy-do not necessarily (al-
though it may turn out to be so empirically) represent primitive stages of
realization that the race has long since gone beyond. I am not here retail-
ing some cheap relativism which would disable us from preferring our
arrangements to theirs; rather, I am saying that whatever preferences we
have are themselves historically constituted in relation to various contend-
ing political and social agendas, and that when we defend them or reiter-
ate them (as Posner does here) we are doing so not in the name of some
transparent truth, but in the name of interests whose universality is al-
ways contestable.
What are Posner's interests? The question may seem abrupt and unre-
lated to the linguistic and philosophical arguments of the preceding pages,
but in fact it is a question Posner himself invites in those places where he
invokes the notion of "power" as still another way of distinguishing be-
tween legal and literary interpretation. The argument is that since literary
critics operate in a realm where consequences are minimal-what harm,
after all, will be done if a critic substitutes "his will for that of Word-
sworth or Yeats" 36-it does not matter that much if their actions are (rel-
atively) unconstrained. Lawyers and judges, on the other hand, operate in
the public world of government and regulation and "[iun our society the
exercise of power by appointed officials . . . is tolerated only in the belief
that the power is somehow constrained."' While "[tihe critic who inter-
prets an ambiguous work of literature is not imposing his view on anyone
else . . . the court that interprets an ambiguous provision . . . is impos-
ing its view on the rest of society, often with far-reaching practical conse-
quences."38 One could question this distinction from several directions, by
arguing, for example, that the actions of literary critics can have conse-
quences as far reaching and practical as the decision of any court. The
judgment of an authoritatively placed literary critic (Matthew Arnold, Li-







gets taught in the schools, what appears in the curriculum, what gains
entrance into the canon, what gets published, reviewed, anthologized, dis-
seminated, and in all of these ways can finally have an effect on the very
structure of a culture, its favored myths, storehouse of moral values,
modes of intellectual inquiry, etc. I am not saying that these effects are the
same as the effects of a judicial pronouncement (although the edicts of
some literary critics have precisely that force), but that they are no less
"far reaching," and that the difference between them is the difference be-
tween differing spheres of and routes to consequentiality, not the differ-
ence between consequentiality and its opposite.
This is of course a version of the argument I have been making all
along in which I challenge Posner's laying down of essentialist distinctions
by the double strategy of first denying the distinctions and then histori-
cizing them. But for the moment I am less interested in challenging the
distinction between legal and literary consequentiality than in asking for
what reason-in the service of what agenda-Posner makes it, and the
answer to this question puts a new twist on his discussion of power. For it
turns out that Posner's attribution of powerlessness to literary interpreta-
tion, at least in comparison to legal interpretation, is itself a (disguised)
move in a power game. The stakes in the game are named in the very first
sentence of the essay: "After a century as an autonomous discipline, aca-
demic law in America is busily ransacking the social sciences and the hu-
manities for insights and approaches with which to enrich our under-
standing of the legal system." 9 The issue then is the autonomy of
academic law, and it of course has been the issue in every one of the
distinctions so far discussed. The implication is that Posner will reassert
that autonomy in the face of recent challenges to it. But that is a less than
candid view of the matter since he says nothing at all about the social
sciences (and it is hard to see how he could, given his determination to
hand over academic law to one of them on a silver platter); rather, he
turns his critical attention to literary studies and argues, as we have seen,
for their irrelevance to the legal system, an irrelevance attributed at least
in part to the extent to which they are removed from the operations of
real power, are not where the action is. But what is presented as a dismis-
sal rendered from a position of strength-the sitting Judge hears the case
of the petitioning literary critics and finds it weak-is in fact an action far
more defensive, for what Posner fails to report are the incursions already
made into academic law, and particularly into the domain of legal inter-
pretation, by literary studies. His admonition-don't look for very much
help from literary studies-comes too late; for, as he surely knows, recent
years have seen an unprecedented traffic between legal and literary stud-
ies, with the former borrowing and appropriating far more than the latter,
39. P. 1351.
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and to considerable effect. Not only is it now difficult to tell some num-
bers of the Stanford Law Review or The Yale Law Journal from Diacrit-
ics and Critical Inquiry, but the issues debated in their pages have spilled
out into tenure battles, the restructuring of curricula and even of whole
law schools, and produced a general sense in the legal profession of a new
crisis in which its authority-internal and external-is being put into
question as never before. This, of course, is what the Critical Legal Stud-
ies Movement is all about, and it is from literary analysis of interpretation
that this movement takes many of its arguments and techniques. The fact
that Posner does not even refer to the movement is of a piece with the
strategy I have already noted: Committed to a weak position-weak be-
cause the developments he warns against have already occurred-he hides
its weakness by neglecting to mention those developments.
Of course, he does more than that: He puts forward an argument
against the significance of the developments he neglects to mention. It is,
he declares, a "great false hope" that literary theory "will change the way
in which lawyers think about the interpretation of statutes and the Consti-
tution.140 That, it seems to me, is an empirical question, and the evidence
is not yet in. I agree with Posner that given the present construction of the
legal world, a deconstructive interpretive theory will not be readily trans-
latable into a viable legal practice (this is, of course, the problematic that
continually engages the Critical Legal Studies Movement); but it could be
the case that the dissemination of such a theory might play a role in alter-
ing the way in which the legal world is constructed by altering the ways
in which legal actors conceive of their activities. Indeed there is already
evidence that literary theory has changed the way in which some lawyers
think about the interpretation of statutes and the Constitution, and it is at
least possible (but not inevitable) that this change in the characterization
of interpretive labors (of what they are "really" like) could play a role in
changing those labors themselves. The evidence I am thinking of includes
citations by courts of pieces in the pioneering Texas Law Review special
issue on interpretation' and the introduction into the Bork hearings of
arguments about intention and literal meaning that are obviously derived
from the writing of prominent literary critics. To be sure the evidence is
inconclusive and the vast majority of legal business is still done within the
traditional notions of literal meanings, transparent intentions, determinate
texts, and stable precedents; but if certain forces in the legal academy
grow more numerous and outlive their detractors (the second is a certain
occurrence), then who knows?
I referred earlier to some significant omissions in Posner's argument:
His silence on the subject of economics after mentioning the social sciences
40. P. 1360.
41. Law as Literature, 60 TEx. L. REV. 1 (1982).
[Vol. 97: 777
Law and Literature
in the first sentence; his failure to acknowledge the Critical Legal Studies
Movement even by name, although one member of that movement (Gary
Peller) is scorned in a footnote."2 I call these omissions significant because
they alert us, as omissions often do, to the real and not-so-hidden agenda
that lurks behind the one forthrightly proclaimed. Although Posner says
nothing about economics, the effort he mounts here to de-authorize liter-
ary studies is intended to clear the field so that the authority of economics
in the legal academy can be secured; and since members of the Critical
Legal Studies Movement are among the most prominent and forceful op-
ponents of Law and Economics, Posner is obliged to disarm them, which
is precisely what he will succeed in doing if he manages to discredit the
discipline from which they take so much of their arsenal. The entire es-
say, then, is something of a feint; it directs our attention to the supposed
limitations of literary interpretation but its primary, if unstated, purpose
is to legitimize the interpretive strategies authorized by economics.
By and large, the feint is successful, but there are several ostensibly
literary moments where the economic agenda peeps through. One occurs
in the context of Posner's repeated assertion that literary works are not to
be read with the intentions of the author in mind since when they are
deciphered or reported the intentions of authors-statements as to what
they meant-are often banal. His example is the poetry of Ezra Pound,
which, he says, is often "quite beautiful"; but its beauty, he continues, has
nothing to do with the messages Pound apparently intends, which are at
times "false and even absurd" as in those passages "that denounce
usury."'4 3 Pound has of course been faulted for many things, but one won-
ders what kind of reader would single out the critique of usury as a par-
ticularly objectionable feature of his poetry. The answer, of course, is a
proponent of the doctrines of Law and Economics, and it would seem that
at some level Posner detects in the perspectives offered by literary and
deconstructive theory a danger to the program with which he is so closely
associated. It is after all a thesis of deconstructive theory that forms of
representation, of which any system of currency is an instance, are always
agencies of power and manipulation and never simply stand in for natural
forces like the market. Perhaps the trouble with literary studies is not that
they are irrelevant but that, at least potentially, they are too relevant.
A second moment at which Posner's possibly wider agenda can be spied
occurs in a footnote. The note is to a discussion of Shakespeare's
Merchant of Venice in which Posner argues that although "[a]t one level
the play is about the enforcement of a contract that contains a penalty
clause,""" that is not its real point. The real point is, of course, metaphori-
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cal and general and therefore nothing one need worry about. The footnote
to the argument cites a 1964 book entitled Shakespeare's Politics by one
A. Bloom, whom we have recently come to know as Allan Bloom, the
author of The Closing of the American Mind,45 a sustained diatribe
against exactly the theory and theorizing that Posner is declaring to be
beside the legal point. One could pursue many paths here beginning per-
haps with a counter-reading of The Merchant of Venice in which the
center of the play is precisely the contract, and its lesson is the rejection of
both literalism and usury as complementary realizations of a spiritual
poverty, a lesson Posner would surely find uncomfortable. Or one could
explore the "Chicago connection," which finds a neo-conservative disciple
of Leo Strauss cited by a neo-conservative legal economist who in the
company of (among others) a prominent former Dean of the University of
Chicago Law School supported the nomination to the Supreme Court of a
neo-conservative literalist and formalist who publicly attributed his theo-
retical awakening to a period spent in that same university. Or one could
go in still another direction and note the repeated appearance in Posner's
notes of E.D. Hirsch, another intellectual with connections to Chicago
who, along with the aforementioned Bloom, is providing Secretary of Ed-
ucation William Bennett and others with ammunition for their attack on
the humanities in general and on literary interpretivism in particular; an
attack that has been recently stepped up in the press, and will soon, I am
told, be receiving congressional attention. But whichever path one fol-
lowed (and there are others) the result would be to highlight the extent to
which Posner's essay, as innocently occasional as it might seem, is part
and parcel of a wholesale effort to restructure several key American insti-
tutions in accordance with a very definite, and some would say extreme,
political and moral vision.
It might seem that I am inflating the significance of what is after all a
slight and flawed piece, full of misinformation and blunders (including the
howler of criticizing Shakespeare for his "failure" to publish his plays,4 )
uncomprehending of the positions to which it is opposed, finally less an
argument than a collection of outdated pieties. Indeed, it might seem suffi-
45. A. BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND (1987).
46. P. 1367. Again the point hinges on an awareness of historical context. It would have required
a cognitive restructuring for Shakespeare and his contemporaries to have seen his plays as "litera-
ture," that is, as permanent and stable verbal objects. Rather, they would have regarded a play as
something recreated in its every performance. The notion of the Shakespearian text as something
sacred, fixed, and publishable, is a product of Shakespeare studies. One might say that the decisive
gesture is Ben Johnson's: He publishes his own plays in 1616 and therefore makes thinkable the
subsequent publication in 1623 of the Shakespeare folio. Posner's mistake is to assume that notions
like authorship, property, literature, and text, are stable across time and are basic components of any
literary culture. For an admirably concise summary, see Orgel, The Authentic Shakespeare, 21 REP-
RESENTATIONS 1 (1988); see also Orgel, Prospero's Wife, 8 REPRESENTATIONS 1 (1984); Foucault,
What Is an Author?, in TEXTUAL STRATEGIES 141 (J. Harari ed. 1979) (discussing historical contin-
gency of concepts of author and literary "work").
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cient to leave the judgment of it to the full verse from which my title is
taken:
Don't know much about the Middle Ages,
Look at the pictures and turn the pages;
Don't know much about no rise and fall;
Don't know much about nothing at all.4
But while there would be a certain satisfaction in this gesture, it would be
too easy and it would reproduce the mistake for which I have criticized
Posner, the mistake of accepting at face value the boundaries that separate
disciplines and render their respective activities discrete from one another.
In fact, neither disciplines nor the activities they enable are discrete, but
exist in networks of affiliation and reciprocity that can sometimes be
glimpsed (as they are here) in footnotes that reveal how a position taken
in one corner of the institutional world is authorized by and authorizes in
its turn positions of a similar kind taken elsewhere. Given the structural
interdependence between disciplines, the effects of a piece of writing will
always extend to contexts apparently far removed from the ones explicitly
addressed; and this will be especially true in the case of someone like
Posner, who is after all an appellate judge of national reputation and a
scholar of enormous influence. This means that when he pronounces on
something-even when, as in this case, the pronouncement is uninformed
and slipshod-he will receive a respectful hearing, and therefore it is in-
cumbent upon those who find his views not only wrong, but supportive of
wrong views now being put forward in other (sometimes high) places, to
challenge them in the strongest terms possible.
47. What a Wonderful World (L. Adler, W. Alpert & S. Cooke) (song lyrics).
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